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
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
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FEDAYEEN - ARAB STATES: The Black September Organization (BSO) will no doubt persevere in staging terrorist actions to gain its objectives in the face of revulsion against the execution of the three diplomats in Khartoum yesterday. The guerrillas are believed to be still holding the Jordanian chargé and the Saudi ambassador hostage.

There are already indications that Black September is planning additional terrorist actions to strengthen their bargaining position for the release of a senior BSO official, Muhammad Awadh (Abu Daud), who was captured by the Jordanians along with his team of 16 guerrillas in early February.

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Palestinian guerrillas intend to stage another action "within 48 hours" to follow on their bold stroke in Khartoum. Among other operations being considered is the abduction of the US ambassador to Iran. The terrorists believe that the Shah has great influence with King Husayn and that the King would be likely to accede to his request to release the Black September prisoners held in Amman.

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Black September's determination to free Awadh, identified as the planner of the Munich operation, was made abundantly clear in Khartoum. If the demands of the terrorists in Sudan are not met, Black September is almost certain to try to seize hostages elsewhere.

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THE KOREAS: North Korea has postponed the next round of North-South talks scheduled to begin on 6 March.

North Korea's excuse is "unavoidable internal reasons," and this could reflect a reappraisal of their negotiating strategy in the wake of Foreign Minister Ho Tam's consultations with Chou En-lai in Peking last month, both before and after Dr. Kissinger's visit.

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The Chinese may have given him some further advice on dealing with the South, especially on the US troop presence and the Korean issue at the UN, which now require rethinking by the North Korean leadership.

Pyongyang may also be using delaying tactics to pressure Seoul to be more accommodating when the talks resume. The South Koreans have been urging a resumption of the dialogue as a means of enhancing their domestic and international position, particularly in the UN, but they have refused to accelerate the slow and deliberate pace of the negotiations--much to Pyongyang's frustration. North Korean propaganda severely condemns this attitude and demands that the South Koreans agree to specific forms of "political" collaboration, joint economic cooperation, and mutual reduction of arms.

The North Koreans probably will not allow the negotiations to reach an indefinite impasse and are continuing to maintain contact with Seoul through informal channels. Whatever the real reason for the postponement of the formal talks, it is not likely to move Seoul to alter objections to political agreements at this time. It could, however, spur the South Koreans to speed up their planning for economic exchanges.

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PHILIPPINES-LIBYA-MALAYSIA: President Marcos is resuming strong military action against the Muslim insurgents in the south, a move which could spark international repercussions.

According to the US Embassy, Marcos believes that earlier conciliatory gestures have done nothing to stem the spread of the insurgency.

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Although the date for the launching of the large-scale offensive is not yet known, the government has already gathered a 4,000-man force in the south.

A major military move against the Muslim dissidents would probably create serious diplomatic problems for Marcos. Libyan leader Qadhafi would undoubtedly intensify his efforts to drum up support for an emergency conference of Islamic foreign ministers to discuss Philippine mistreatment of the Muslims. In addition, Libya would probably increase its financial support to the rebels and might renew recent unsuccessful attempts to get Indonesia and Malaysia to support the insurgents. Indonesia and Malaysia will undoubtedly continue to oppose Qadhafi's efforts to rally the Islamic world against the Philippines, although both will find it difficult not to express some measure of concern if new military actions inflict significant casualties among Muslim Filipinos.

If the military offensive goes badly, as has happened in the past, Marcos might well put the blame on outside interference.

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
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
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THE YEMENS: Although unity talks are continuing, it is becoming increasingly clear that neither side is serious about a negotiated merger.

Sana is fearful that unity would mean domination by Aden's Marxist regime but is reluctant to torpedo the negotiations. Sana had hoped to force Aden to this step by pushing so hard for rapid progress that it would have no choice but to accept unity on Sana's terms or reject it outright. This strategy is not paying off.



Both Sana and Aden have long professed interest in union but these sentiments were never translated into action until the unity agreement was signed in October 1972. The present unity project arose out of negotiations for a cease-fire following an outbreak of border fighting last fall. Both parties accepted the unity concept, under pressure from other Arab governments, as much in a desire for a respite from the fighting as in expectation that the agreement would be implemented. Having achieved the immediate goal of stopping hostilities, both sides lost interest in the agreement, although both feel constrained to continue the talks for the time being.



ZAMBIA: Despite the recent rise in copper prices, the cost of re-routing Zambia's foreign trade away from Rhodesia will be more than Lusaka can finance without substantial foreign aid.

Since 10 January, when Zambia stopped sending its copper through Rhodesia, the price of copper has risen from 50 to 64 cents a pound on the London Metal Exchange. The increase is only partially attributable to expectations that Zambia would be unable to export all of the more than 300,000 tons of copper that would normally transit Rhodesia annually. Copper prices have been driven upward by a reported shortfall in Chilean production, a major copper refinery strike in Belgium, large purchases by China, and a surge of speculation in all metals following the dollar devaluation on 12 February.

Even if favorable copper prices hold, Zambia will be hard-pressed to maintain the flow of imports that formerly passed through Rhodesia. Preliminary estimates [redacted] indicate that \$150 million will be necessary to re-route this traffic during the first year alone. These increased expenses fall largely on the Zambian Government because both the transport facilities and the copper enterprises are government-owned. The government is already faced with the prospect of a \$200-million budget deficit. Any increase in taxes is unlikely because they already are at very high levels. [redacted]

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